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INTRODUCTION
Economic growth is arguably the issue of primary concern to economic policy makers.
Intertemporal models of capital accumulation known as the neoclassical models are
not well suited to address issues regarding long run growth because they yield station-
ary equilibria. Hence, this thesis is an aspiration to study the determinants of long
run growth; in order to explain long run growth rate as an endogenous equilibrium
outcome of the behaviour of rational optimizing agents, an outcome that reects the
structural characteristics of the economy, such as technology and preference as well
as macroeconomic policy.
In Chapter two, I approach the question on whether long run growth depends on
both innovation and physical capital accumulation or whether it depends on either
of the two? This inquiry is motivated by the prediction of neoclassical model which
argued that capital accumulation has no long run e¤ects on growth, and the conven-
tional macroeconomic policy has no inuence on long run growth performance. It
is also implied by the early innovation literature such as Aghion and Howit (1992)
which shows that long run growth is determined by technological progress indepen-
dent of physical capital accumulation. Against this predictions, DeLong and Summers
(1991) found that countries with the highest growth rates are those that invest highly
in machinery and in which the relative price of equiment has fallen more quickly.
Mankiw (1995) argued that growth can be accounted for by physical capital accu-
mulation independent of technological progress (see: ). But DeLong and Summers
(1992) ndings stroke a more reconciliatory tone by showing that large di¤erence in
growth rates cannot be driven by shifts in equipment investment rate uncorrelated
with TFP growth. Chapter two follows Aghion & Howitt (1998) who argued that new
technology is capital using and showed a complementary model where both innova-
tion and physical capital accumulation matter for the long run growth of an economy.
By using a monopoly market structure, they showed that capital accumulation would
raise the equilibrium ow of prots as a result of increasing national income which in
turn raises the demand of the monopolists goods. High prots due to high capital in-
tensity would then enhance the incentive for more innovation; just as more innovation
would raise the productivity of capital.
My model extends Aghion & Howitt (1998) by introducing learning into the basic
Schumpeterian model to show essentially that economies that focus on technological
progress alone without learning adaptation of these technology are more likely to grow
less than economies with learning adaptation. Learning extrnalities is dened as the
total amount of capital that has been accumulated by all rms which determine
5the local condition of capital use in the economy. So that , learning adaptation
is how each monopolist who produces new technology tailors her production to be
more e¢ cient in response to local condition. Consequently, learning adaptation will
induce higher R&D by raising the national income and hence the demand for the
monopolist good. A higher monopolist prot due to e¢ cient use of capital in response
to local condition drives the incentive for more intense R&D. Unlike learning by doing
model of Romer(1986) and Frankel(1962) under perfect competition where learning
contributes directly to technological progress in order to obtain long run growth; in
my model with monopolist market structure, long run growth depends directly on
innovation through R&D but learning has an indirect e¤ect on long run growth by
raising the incentive for research.
In Chapter three, I approach the question on whether both human capital and
innovation matter for long run ? Also I approach the question om whether horizon-
tal innovation has a neutralizing e¤ect on long run growth? Unlike physical capital,
early endogenous growth theory unequivocally argued that human capital has a pos-
itive long run e¤ect on growth(see: Lucas (1988). Early R&D growth literatures
also argued that innovation has a long run e¤ect on growth( see: Aghion & Howitt
(1992), , Grossman and Helpman (1991)). But the prediction of scale e¤ect1 in the
early R&D growth literatrues has questioned the role of innovation in the long run.
For instance, the empirical study of Jones (1995a) showed the absence of scale e¤ect
in the post war II era. Jones showed that the number of scientist and engineers
engaged in R&D in the United State grew from under 200,000 in 1950 to almost 1
million by 1987 yet growth rate in the United state remained constant during this
period. To eliminate scale e¤ect, Jones (1995b) developed a semi - endogenous
growth model which assumed decreasing returns in technological progress to account
for the declining growth in the post war era II, and used labour as an input in re-
search, so that increasing population growth is require to o¤set the decreasing return
in technological progress and thus put the economy on a constant returns. The
implication of his model overturned the predictions of early R&D growth literatures,
and implied that policies that a¤ect research intensity has no long run growth since
long run growth depends on exogenous population growth. Some endogenous litera-
tures such as Arnold (1998) and Blackburn Keith, Victor T.Y. Hung, and Alberto F.
Pozzolo (2000) have exploited the semi - endogenous growth model of Jones (1995b)
by using human capital implace of labour as an input in research to argue that long
run growth rate would depend solely on human capital accumulation. Despite the
advantages of these scale invariant models that deny the role of innovation in the long
run; the empirical works of Brander and Dowrick (1994), Kelley and Schmidt (1995),
and Ahituv (2001) showed that population growth has a negative e¤ect on economic
1Scale e¤ect means that variations in the size or scale of the economy, as measured by population,
say, a¤ect the size of the long run growth rate.
6growth. Arnold (1998) and Blackburn Keith, Victor T.Y. Hung, and Alberto F. Poz-
zolo (2000) also used human capital as the only input in innovation but R&D uses
other kinds of inputs and machinery. DeLong and Summers (1992) ndings that that
large di¤erence in growth rates cannot be driven by shifts in equipment investment
rate uncorrelated with TFP growth provides support for the role of innovation in the
long run.
Howitt (1999) in an attempt to restore the policy implications of the early R&D
growth model while at the same time eliminate scale e¤ect built a model that com-
bined both horizontal and vertical innovation; and argued that horizontal innovation
proliferates vertical innovation. That is, as the economy grows, horizontal innovations
neutralizes the scale e¤ect on the incentive to innovate by adding to the number of
independent sectors over which research must be spread, and over which manufactur-
ing labour must also be spread. Jones(1999) determined that Howitts model would
only succeed in eliminating scale e¤ect if population growth and horizontal innovation
grows at a constant rate. He found that if population growth outgrows horizontal
innovation then scale e¤ect will resurface and if horizontal innovation outgrows pop-
ulation growth then horizontal innovation will have negative e¤ect on growth.
Chapter three used a share of output instead of human capital alone as an input
in research and introduce human capital in the product market to show that both
innovation and human capital matter for long run growth rate. I show that once
human capital , population growth, horizontal innovation , physical capital and tech-
nological progress are growing at a constant rate; then scale e¤ect will be eliminated.
I also show that if horizontal innovation outgrows population growth, the economy
will grow by more because horizontal innovations open up new sectors on which ver-
tical innovation could thrive when the existing vertical innovation becomes di¢ cult
to innovate on. If on the other hand population growth outgrows horizontal innova-
tion then population growth will have a negative e¤ect on growth. Therefore given
the empirical support mentioned above that population growth has negative e¤ect
on growth suggest that horizontal innovations have not kept pace with population
growth.
Chapter four challenges another benchmark of the basic Schumpeterian model,
namely that competition has a negative e¤ect on innovation and growth. Contrary
to this prediction, the empirical works of Nickell (1996) and Blundell R., Gri¢ th,
R. and Van reennen, J. (1995) showed that competition has a positive e¤ect on inno-
vation and growth. Notably, the basic Schumpeterian model discussed competition
as rm entry but the existing theoretical model on innovation that showed positive
e¤ect of competition on innovation discussed competition among existing rms with
no rm entry (See: Aghion , Harris and Vickers (2001) ). The current chapter pro-
vides the rationale for exogenous threat of rm entry. I endogenise rm entry and
show that the reason why rm entry is represented as an exogenous threat is be-
cause in a Nash equilibrium, incumbents who could engage in innovation would have
7technological advantage over entrants(Otherwise, incumbents could not innovate due
to Arrows e¤ect). Hence, when technological advantage is large, incumbents would
raise their R&D e¤ort to deter rm entry. Furthermore I argue that there is an im-
plicit psychological threat that the incumbent feel to make him innovate and escape
competition when he has technological advantage. This framework is supported by
the empirical work of Goolsbee and Syverson (2004) who examined how incumbent
behavior changes in response to exogenous changes in potential entry that otherwise
have no e¤ect on current competitive conditions. They found that incumbent airlines
cut their fares when an entrant merely annouces thier intention of entry, even before
actual entry.
In chapter ve, I examine the impact of RJV on economic growth when RJV
rms also engage in collusion in the product market. This research is motivated by
the empirical work of Sovinsky and Helland (2012) which showed that the incentive
to engage in RJV is to collude in the product market. To simply the analysis, I
introduce a duopoly market structure where the duopolists are level in terms of tech-
nological progess in their sector. Thus they have more incentive to collude in other
to avoid Bertrand competition. Then I made a novel contribution by introducing
consumption externality under duopoly market structure with level sectors to show
that duopolist in a level sector may also collude in the product market in order to
internalize consumption externality that no single rm can internalize, in an economy
where consumersutility depends not only on the level of their consumption but also
on how their consumption compares to some reference stock widely known as "keeping
up with the Joneses." By colluding to internalize the reference stock, the duopolist
can operate a dynamic pricing model to encourage habit formation. That is, they
reduce their price when the reference stock is low in order to encourage consumption
but gradually increase their price as the reference stock increases. This process en-
courages individuals who would have been detered by high price of a product to learn
how to spend more as thier habit towards the product increases. This paper features
two key parameters denoted by  which measures the importance individuals place
on the reference stock and the parameter J which measures the level of the reference
stock. I found that increase in  has a negative e¤ect on growth because it raises the
shadow cost of dynamic pricing model. But increase in J has a positive e¤ect on
growth because it raises the price that the duopolist can charge as habit formation
rises. Hence it raises incentive for more innovation.
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LEARNING AND INNOVATION: A
COMPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIP.
2.1 Introduction
From the empirical perspective, the empirical work of Delong and Summers (1991)
suggests that countries with the highest growth rates are those that invests highly
in machinery and in which the relative price of equipment has fallen more quickly;
thereby emphasized the role of physical capital in determining growth rate. This
position is also supported by other models that argued for the role of capital in
the long run. For instance, Mankiw (1995) argued that cross - country variation in
growth rate could be explained by capital accumulation independent of technological
progress. Jorgnenson (1995) maintained similar position in his study of the U.S
economy.
But from the theoretical point of view, early innovation literatures like Aghion
and Howitt (1992) emphasized the role of innovation in the long run independent of
capital accumulation. Even the standard neoclassical model taught us that physical
capital would not have a long run e¤ect on growth due to diminishing return in
capital accumulation and that growth depends solely on technological progress. On
the other hand, theoretical models that supported the role of physical capital in the
long run were mostly learning by doing models such as Romer (1987), Arrow (1962);
but these class of learning by doing models predicted that in the long run, growth is
determined by steady state level and not the per capita steady state growth rate. Yet
the U.S experience showed that per capita growth rate has been constant between
the period of 1870 to 2000 at the rate of 1.8 percent per year(See: Maddison (1991)).
Hence there is a theoretical gap to account for per capita steady state growth rate
that shows the importance of physical capital in the long run.
DeLong and Summers (1992) empirical study stroke a more reconciliatory tone by
showing that large di¤erence in growth rates cannot be driven by shifts in equipment
investment rate uncorrelated with TFP growth.the incentive for more intense R&D.
Aghion and Howit (1998), then made the rst attempt to develop a complemen-
tary model of both innovation and capital accumulation. They made a specication
in which capital was used as an input in the production of intermediate goods by
monopolists who hold patent right for innovation. Hence, they showed that capital
accumulation would have an indirect e¤ect on long run growth by raising the equi-
librium ow of prots as a result of increasing national income that would raise the
9demand of monopolists goods, which would then enhance the incentive to innovate1;
just as more innovation would raise the productivity of capital.
My present research argues that there is a reason to suspect that capital would
have long run e¤ect on growth through learning by doing . For instance, Mowery
& Rosenberg (1989) criticized those who regard innovation as the application of up-
stream scientic knowledge to the downstream activity of new products and new
manufacturing process. In light with that criticism, I argue that monopolist who pro-
duces new technology tailors her production to be more e¢ cient in response to local
condition. Thus I dened learning extrnalities as the total amount of capital that has
been accumulated by all rms which determines the local condition of capital use in
the economy. So that , learning adaptation is how each monopolist who produces new
technology tailors her production to be more e¢ cient in response to local condition.
Consequently, learning adaptation will induce higher R&D by raising the national
income by more and hence the demand for the monopolist good by more. A higher
monopolist prot due to e¢ cient use of capital in response to local condition drives
the incentive for more intense R&D. I found that the presence of learning implies
that net income will be growing my more than when learning is absent. Finally, I
introduce the social planners framework with learning and technological progresss in
order to determine the e¤ects of tax and subsidy policies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 2.2, I introduce the decen-
tralized economy with private monopolists market structure and shows how learning
enters R&D growth model. I also introduce the research sector which is the engine of
growth in this model and present the utility function and the dynamic optimization
solution for the decentralized economy. In section 2.3, I analyse the steady state of the
decentralized economy and show that when learning is present, then long run growth
is higher than when learning is absent. In section 2.4, I introduce the social planners
economy and solve the social planners dynamic optimizaton problem. In section 2.5,
I determine the e¤ects of tax and subsidy policies. Finally, I o¤er conclusion.
2.2 Model.
This paper follows Aghion and Howitt (1998) that studied the role of physical capital
on long run growth but introduce learning. The setup is the basic Schumpeterian
growth framework of Aghion and Howitt (1992) which argued that only the entrant
rms do innovation ( never the incumbent rms). The equilibrium features a previous
entrant who becomes an incumbent and internalizes his obsolesence in calculating his
present discounted value due to expected arrival of next entrant that will destroy his
monopoly position in the process of creative destruction.
1By convention, a monopoly market structure is used in modeling private R&D because private
inventors would need prot incentive to innovate. This incentive is secured by patent award
which gives them exclusivity to commercialize their innovation.
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2.2.1 Product Market.
Output is produced under perfect competition and is used for consumption, research
and can be stored in the form of capital. The production of output depends on inputs
of di¤erent intermediate products. Once idea with a productivity Ai, where i 2 [0; 1]
is generated from research, it is produced into intermediate goods using capital, then
the intermediate goods serve as inputs in the production of the nal good. Thus the
aggregate production function is given as
Yt = Ct +Nt + It = L
1 ax1 at
Z 1
0
A1 ait x
a
itdi; (2.1)
where 0 < a < 1
Equation (2.1) shows that output Yt can be stored as capital, denoted by gross
investment It, used for consumption denoted by Ct and for research denoted by Nt.
Output is produced using a constant supply of the societys xed stock of labour L
along with the ow of intermediate inputs xit . Ait Notice that x1 at is outside the
intergral sign in equation (2.1); hence I dene xt =
R 1
0 xitdiR 1
0 Aitdi
to denote the learning
externality expressed in productivity adjusted term2, that no single rm can inter-
nalize. Because learning becomes di¢ cult as innovation becomes di¢ cult, this model
does not exhibit explosive growth. Notice that learning externalities are the total
amount of capital that has been accumulated by all rms which determines the local
condition of capital use in the economy. So that , learning adaptation is how each
monopolist who produces new technology tailors her production to be more e¢ cient
in response to local condition. .
Each intermediate input is produced using capital that is rented from household
by monopolists with patent award
xit = Kit (2.2)
where Kit is the amount of capital used as input. Thus the cost to monopolist is
Rtxit = RtKit . Where Rt is the rental rate of capital. The monopolist maximize his
prot it, measured in units of nal good through the prot function
it = Pitxit  Rtxit (2.3)
where Pit denotes the price of intermediate good and his revenue equals Pitxit.
I assume that the nal good production sector is perfectly competititve, thus the
price of a factor of production equals the value of its marginal product. Firms in the
nal goods sector maximize prot given by
2Notice that I expressed learning in productivity adjusted term and it is outside the integral.
Thus following the conventional argument made in innovation literature that innovation becomes
more complex as it increases; I assume that learning becomes more di¢ cult as it increases.
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Yt   wtL 
Z 1
0
Pitxit (2.4)
The rst order conditions implies that
Pit = L
1 aaA1 ait x
a 1
it x
1 a
t (2.5)
and
wt = (1  a)L a
Z 1
0
A1 ait x
a
itdi (2.6)
where wt is the equilibrium wage rate .
From equation (2.5) the corresponding demand function implies
xit =

aL1 aA1 ait x
1 a
t
Pit
 1
1 a
(2.7)
To determine the monopolists price, substitute equation (2.7) into equation (2.3)
to get
it = (Pit  Rt)

aL1 aA1 ait x
1 a
t
Pit
 1
1 a
(2.8)
which can be rewritten as
it =

P
 a
1 a
it
 
aL1 aA1 ait x
1 a
t
 1
1 a  Rt
 
aL1 aA1 ait x
1 a
t
 1
1 a P
  1
1 a
it

(2.9)
Finding the rst order condition with respect to Pit gives
@it
@Pit
=
  a
1  aP
 1
1 a
it
 
aL1 aA1 ait x
1 a
t
 1
1 a +
1
1  aRt
 
aL1 aA1 ait x
1 a
t
 1
1 a P
 2+a
1 a
it

(2.10)
solving for Pit gives the monopoly price mark up on the marginal cost of produc-
tion.
Pit =
Rt
a
(2.11)
By substituting equation (2.11) into equation (2.7) gives the equilibrium quantity
chosen by the monopolist to maximize her prot ,
xit =

a2x1 at
Rt
 1
1 a
AitL (2.12)
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The rental rate of capital is determined in the capital market, where supply is Kt
and the demand of capital is the sum of all sectors demand thus;Z 1
0
xitdi =
Z 1
0
Kitdi (2.13)
Using equation (2.12) the equilibrium quantity can be expressed in terms of capital
thus
Kt = L
Z 1
0

a2
Rt
 1
1 a
Aitdix
1 a
1 a
t =

a2x1 at
Rt
 1
1 a
AtL (2.14)
Where At =
R 1
0
Aitdi represent the average productivity parameter andKt denotes
the aggregate capital stock . We can then capture the aggregate capital stock in per
e¤ective worker unit as
kt = xt =
Kt
At
(2.15)
Hence equation (2.14) can be expressed in capital e¢ ciency unit to determine the
rental rate of capital in per e¤ective worker thus
Rt = a
2 (2.16)
where L = 1
Notice that the equilibrium rental rate, Rt is a constant a2. The reason is because
learning o¤sets diminishing return in capital accumulation. In absence of learning in
equation(2.14), the rental rate of capital yields the outcome in Aghion and Howitt
(1998) where learning is absent written here as.
Rt = a
2ka 1t L
1 a (2.17)
The di¤erence between the rental rate under learning adaption in equation (2.16)
and the Aghion and Howitt (1998) version in equation (2.17) is the presence of di-
minishing return exhibited by Aghion and Howitts rental rate whereas the rental rate
is constant in the present paper. Since learning is the factor that plays the o¤set-
ing e¤ect on diminishing return on capital, it underlies the argument that learning
adaptation leads to more e¢ cient use of capital in response to local condition.
From the perspective of the owner of capital, the equilibrium rental rate of capital
must pay for the interest rate rt and the depreciation rate . Thus the equilibrium
rental rate can be expressed as
Rt = rt +  (2.18)
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Equation (2.16) and (2.18) implies that the rate of interest will be given as
rt = a
2    (2.19)
Since
xit = Ait

Kt
At

= Aitkt (2.20)
substituting equation (2.16) and (2.20) into equation (2.3) implies
it =  (kt)AitL
1 a (2.21)
where the productivity adjusted prot function is
 (kt) = a(1  a)kt (2.22)
in Aghion and Howitt (1998) where learning is absent, the productivity adjusted
prot function is
 (kt) = a(1  a)katL1 a (2.23)
This can easily be derived using equation (2.17)
If you substitute equation (2.19) into equation (2.1) , you get the aggregate pro-
duction function in capita per e¢ cient unit
Yt = Ct +Nt + It = Atkt (2.24)
where L = 1
This aggregate production function shows the economys GDP because it shows
that output equals consumption plus investment in capital accumulation and research.
2.2.2 Innovation
I assume that innovations are either funded publicly3 or privately and are the source
of long run growth. Each time there is investment to innovate within the sectors in
the economy, the aim is to improve the quality of the previous innovation. Quality
improvement is referred in innovation literatures as vertical innovation(see: Aghion
3I assume public funding of innovation for the sake of section 2.6 where I used the social planners
framework.
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and Howitt (1992)). Ideas owing out from innovation are used to produce an inter-
mediate products which is used as an input in the production of the nal goods in
order to increase the level of output.
There are di¤erent research sectors for di¤erent intermediate goods. Following the
conventional assumption of Poisson rate of arrival of innovation; the Poisson arrival
rate of innovation in each sector i is Nit. Nit denotes the amount of research e¤ort
devoted to sector i. Because the prospective payo¤ to research is the same in all
sectors, the equilibrium research expenditure is the same in all sectors.
Let the Poisson rate of arrival of innovations in equilibrium is given as
_At = Nt (2.25)
 > 0 is the productivity parameter for R&D.
Following Caballero and Ja¤e (1993), the impact of the leading edge technology
as innovation arrives is denoted by the extra services it o¤ers represented as  > 0.
Hence the rate of technological progress at each date yields
gt =
_At
At
= nt ; (2.26)
where nt = NtAt
In equilibrium, the level of vertical R &D is determined by the zero prot condition
; that is, the marginal cost of an extra unit of vertical R & D equal the marginal
expected benet given as
At = Vt: (2.27)
Where Vt is the value of a vertical innovation and At represents the marginal
cost of raising the research intensity Nt . This equation governs the dynamics of the
economy over its successive innovation.
The value Vt is determined by the asset equation;
Vt =
Z 1
t
te
  R t (rs+nt)dsd (2.28)
This equation says that the expected present value of the future prots during a
unit time interval is equal to the ow of prot to be earned by the incumbent before
being replaced. The value to the incumbent is thus
Vt =
t
rt + nt
(2.29)
This equation captures the e¤ect of creative destruction on innovation, particularly
increase in the rate of arrival of innovation shortens the duration of the monopolys
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prot thereby destroying the position of the current incumbent monopolist . The
standard model predicts that this e¤ect will kill the incentive to innovate. For instance
if inventors have perfect foresight and knows that thier innovation will be destroyed
by the next entrant, they will not innovate. Since variables will be growing in thier
e¢ ciency unit, the zero prot condition implies .
1 = vt (2.30)
where vt = VtAt
substitute equation (2.29) into (2.30) to determine equilibrium level of research
intensity
1 = 
a(1  a)ktL1 a
rt + nt
(2.31)
in Aghion and Howitt(1998) where learning is absent, the equilibrium research
intensity is
1 = 
a(1  a)katL1 a
rt + nt
(2.32)
equation(2.31) determines the equilibrium research intensity as a function of capi-
tal intensity k. In Aghion and Howitt (1998) it is denoted as ka. Becuase of decreasing
return in capital accumulaton present in Aghion and Howitts model, research inten-
sity is lower in their model compared to the present model . The solution will be
shown in the steady state analysis.
2.2.3 Household
The utility function is time separable. The aim is to maximize the discounted, innite
stream of utility U , given by
max
Z 1
0
log(Ct)e
 tdt: (2.33)
 is the rate of time preference. Ct denotes aggregate consumption. The utility
function is logarithmic.
Let the budget constraint be represented as
_Kt = Atkt   Kt   Ct  Nt (2.34)
Where Nt denotes the share of output used for research. Kt denotes capital and
 is the depreciation rate of capital
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The current value Hamiltonian is
H = log(Ct) + :[rKt + wL  Ct  Nt] (2.35)
There is only one state variable denoted byKt and the associated co state variable
.  is the shadow value of investment evaluated in current utils in the manufacturing
sector.
The necessary rst order condition for maximizing the Hamiltonian can then be
expressed as follows
e t
1
At
Ct
At
=  (2.36)
where Ct
At
is consumption adjusted productivity
  _ = (rt   ) (2.37)
where rt is the interest rate determined in equation (2.18)
the transversality condition can thus be expressed as
lim
t!1

(kt: exp
 t = 0 (2.38)
Since
d
dt
 
1
At
Ct
At
!
 
1
At
Ct
At
! =   _At
At
+ _ct
ct

Di¤erentiating equation (2.36) with respect to time and combining with equation
(2.37) shows that consumption grows at the rate equal to the di¤erence between the
net marginal product of capital, a2   , and the e¤ective discount rate,  + gt thus
_ct
ct
= a2         gt (2.39)
where gt =
_At
At
the budget constraint will be growing in their e¢ ciency units as
_kt = kt   ct   nt   ( + nt ) kt (2.40)
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2.3 Steady State Growth Analysis
In the steady state, all variables such as capital k, research intensity n , consumption
c will be growing at a constant rate so I shall henceforth drop the time subscript.
To determine research intensity n , we make use of equation (2.18) and (2.39) to
determine r, and then substitute r into equation (2.31) then solve for n from equation
(2.31) here as
n =
a(1  a)kL1 a   ( + )
+  
(2.41)
Finally, the growth rate of the economy is determined by substituting equation
(2.41) into the growth equation (2.26) thus
g =
_A
A
= 

a(1  a)kL1 a   ( + )
1 + 

; (2.42)
For comparative statistic, increase in ; ; a have a positive e¤ect on growth and
increase in  have a negative e¤ect on growth. Increase in L denotes the presence of
scale e¤ect in the standard Schumpeterian model4.
Proposition 1. Growth rate is higher under learning compared to when learning is
absent.
To see this, Aghion and Howitt (1998) showed a similar model where learning
is absent, which we can easily determine using his model specication in equation
(2.32). If you hold the interest rate constant, then the growth rate in absence of
learning is
g =
_A
A
= 

a(1  a)kaL1 a   r (2.43)
similarly the growth rate in my model where learning is present can be rewritten
holding interest rate constant as
g =
_A
A
= 

a(1  a)kL1 a   r (2.44)
Di¤erentiate g and g with respect to k yields respectively
4Scale e¤ect is the feature that variation in the size or scale of the economy, measured
by population has a positive long run e¤ect on growth .
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a(1  a)L1 a (2.45)
and
a2(1  a)ka 1L1 a
Subtracting g from g gives
a(1  a)L1 a  1  aka 1 (2.46)
since R = r+  and r = + g   equation (2.17) implies that capital per e¤ective
worker in absence of learning is
k =

 + gt   
a2
 1
a 1
(2.47)
then substitute equation (2.47) into equation (2.46) to get
(1  a)L1 a (a  [ + gt   ]) > 0 (2.48)
Given the value of the parmeters, it is possible to show that when the factor share
of capital a is high , model with learning will outgrow model without learning due
to higher capital intensity that raises the demand of the innovators goods thereby
raising incentive for future innovation.
2.4 Welfare.
In this section, I examine the social planners problem of R&D - based growth model
in order to determine the e¤ects of tax and subsidy policies.The social planner invests
in R&D, and ideas generated from R&D are used to produce intermediate goods. In-
termediate goods are then used as an input in producing the nal goods in other to
increase the level of output. The main di¤erence between the social planners frame-
work and the Shumpeterian framework presented above is that here, I assume unlike
the Schumpeterian model that the intermediate good sector is perfectly competitive.
By nomalizing Pit = 1 (2.7 ) you get the demand function for the social planner
as
xit = a
1
1 aAitLx
1 a
1 a
t (2.49)
The supply of capital Kt must equal the demand of capital in all sectors demand
thus;
R 1
0
xitdi =
R 1
0
Kitdi. Hence in equilibrium, you can write equation (2.49) in
terms of capital per e¢ ciency unit thus;
xt
At
= kt = a
1
1 aLkt (2.50)
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where kt = KtAt
By substituting equation (2.50) into the aggregate production function of equation
(2.1) yields
Yt = Ct +Nt + It = AtLa
a
1 akt; (2.51)
This equation says that output depends on technological progress and capital
accumulation, where kt denotes learning.
Since the arrival of new innovation raise the average productivity parameter; The
average change in the stock of knowledge is
dAt
dt
= Nt (A
max
t   At) (2.52)
where Amaxt denotes the maximum level of technological progress at a given date t
Using the equations 2.50- 2.52 we can work out the social planners optimiza-
tion problem. Hence the social planner maximizies the utility of the representative
householed by choosing consumption and research expenditure.
The current value Hamiltonian is written as
H = logCt + 

AtLkt

1
a
  1

a
1
1 a   Ct  Nt

+ 	 [Nt (A
max
t   At)] (2.53)
The utility function comes from equation (2.33). The second equation in the
square bracket comes from the combination of equation (2.50)and (2.51) . The third
equation comes from equation (2.52)
The necessary rst order condition for maximizing utility can then be expressed
as follows
@H
@Ct
= e t
1
Ct
=  (2.54)
@H
@Nt
=  = 	 [ (Amaxt   At)] (2.55)
_	 =   (Nt) 	 (2.56)
Since output and technological progress will be growing at at constant rate hence
I rewrite equation (2.56) thus
_	 =  

Lkt

1
a
  1

a
1
1 a

[ (Amaxt   At)] 	 (2.57)
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the transversality condition can thus be expressed as
lim
t!1

(W ) exp t

= 0 (2.58)
where W captures the entire wealth in the economy
Since
Amaxt
At
=  + 15 from equation (2.27). This implies that (Amaxt   At) will grow at
the rate of  . Since   _	
	
= _c
c
+  the optimal consumption as
_c
c
=

kL

1
a
  1

a
1
1 a   

(2.60)
2.5 The E¤ects of Tax and Subsidy Policies
Comparing research intensity between the private monopolist and the social planner
shows that research intensity under decentralized economy is smaller than research
intensity under the centralized economy. Since _c
c
= g = n  the research intensity
for the social planner can be determined using equation(2.60) thus
n =
 
kL
 
1 a
a

a
1
1 a   

!
(2.61)
and the research intensity equation for the private agent is taken from equation
(2.42) thus
n = 
a(1  a)kL  ( + ) (1  s)
(1  s) [ + ] (2.62)
where s denotes the rate of subsidy
Looking at the denomenator, the social discount rate is given as  which is less
than the private discount rate given as [ + ] thus there is more research in the
5The average change in the stock of knowledge is Amaxt  At. This implies that
dAt
dt = nt (A
max
t  At)
let &t =
Amaxt
At
; using equation (24), the evolution of &t takes the form
1
&
 
d&t
dt

= nt   nt (&   1)
By setting 1&
 
d&t
dt

= 0 we have
& =  + 1 (2.59)
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social planners economy than in the decentralized economy. Di¤erentiating research
of the private agent with respect to research subsidy yields
dn
ds
=
a(1  a)kL
(1  s) > 0
This equation shows that research subsidy has a positive e¤ect on research inten-
sity.
2.5.1 Subsidies to capital accumulation .
Turning to capital accumulation the social planners rate of return is a    which is
greater than the private monopolist rate of return a2    which suggests that capital
investment should be subsidized. For instance if one compares the rate of return in a
monopolistic economy and the social planners economy we get
[1  Ts]a2 = a (2.63)
where Ts is the tax rate, so that
Ts =
(a  1)
a
< 0 (2.64)
Thus optimal tax policy is a negative tax.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper extends the Schumpeterian framework of Aghion and Howitt (1998) in
which new technology is capital using . I showed that there an be other reasons why
capital will have a long run e¤ect on growth. Particulary, I argue that innovation
is not simply the application of upstream scientic knowledge to the downstream
activity of new products and new manufacturing process. Rather an innovators who
produces new technology tailors her production to be more e¢ cient in response to local
condition. Hence learning adaptation viewed as how each innovator who produces new
technology tailors her production to be more e¢ cient in response to local condition
can show a di¤erent role played by capital on long run growth. I found that the
presence of learning implies that net income will be growing by more than when
learning is absent. Hence long run growth rate is higher when learning is present
than when learning is absent. Finally, I introduce the social planners framework
with learning and technological progresss in order to determine the e¤ects of tax and
subsidy policies.
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Chapter 3
A SCALE INVARIANT MODEL WITHOUT
DILUTION EFFECT OF HORIZONTAL
INNOVATION.
3.1 Introduction
This paper takes the broadest view so far to study the relationship between physical
capital accumulation, human capital accumulation, innovation(vertical and horizon-
tal) and population growth in order to address the issues ranging from the absence
of scale e¤ect, the impact of physical capital in long run growth, the relationship be-
tween human capital and innovation, and the relationship between population growth
and horizontal innovation.
Early endogenous growth theory unequivocally argued that human capital has a
positive long run e¤ect on growth(see: Lucas (1988). Early R&D growth literatures
also argued that innovation has a long run e¤ect on growth( see: Aghion & Howitt
(1992), , Grossman and Helpman (1991)). But the prediction of scale e¤ect in the
early R&D growth literatrues has questioned the role of innovation in the long run.
For instance, the empirical study of Jones (1995a) showed the absence of scale e¤ect
in the post war II era. Jones showed that the number of scientist and engineers
engaged in R&D in the United State grew from under 200,000 in 1950 to almost 1
million by 1987 yet growth rate in the United state remained constant during this
period. To eliminate scale e¤ect, Jones (1995b) developed a semi - endogenous
growth model which assumed decreasing returns in technological progress to account
for the declining growth in the post war era II, and used labour as an input in re-
search, so that increasing population growth is require to o¤set the decreasing return
in technological progress and thus put the economy on a constant returns. The
implication of his model overturned the predictions of early R&D growth literatures,
and implied that policies that a¤ect research intensity has no long run growth since
long run growth depends on exogenous population growth. Some endogenous litera-
tures such as Arnold (1998) and Blackburn Keith, Victor T.Y. Hung, and Alberto F.
Pozzolo (2000) have exploited the semi - endogenous growth model of Jones (1995b)
by using human capital implace of labour as an input in research to argue that long
run growth rate would depend solely on human capital accumulation. Despite the
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advantages of these scale invariant models that deny the role of innovation in the long
run; the empirical works of Brander and Dowrick (1994), Kelley and Schmidt (1995),
and Ahituv (2001) showed that population growth has a negative e¤ect on economic
growth. Arnold (1998) and Blackburn Keith, Victor T.Y. Hung, and Alberto F. Poz-
zolo (2000) also used human capital as the only input in innovation but R&D uses
other kinds of inputs and machinery. DeLong and Summers (1992) ndings that that
large di¤erence in growth rates cannot be driven by shifts in equipment investment
rate uncorrelated with TFP growth provides support for the role of innovation in the
long run.
Howitt (1999) in an attempt to restore the policy implications of the early R&D
growth model while at the same time eliminate scale e¤ect built a model that com-
bined both horizontal and vertical innovation; and argued that horizontal innovation
proliferates vertical innovation. That is, as the economy grows, horizontal innovations
neutralizes the scale e¤ect on the incentive to innovate by adding to the number of
independent sectors over which research must be spread, and over which manufactur-
ing labour must also be spread. Jones(1999) determined that Howitts model would
only succeed in eliminating scale e¤ect if population growth and horizontal innovation
grows at a constant rate. He found that if population growth outgrows horizontal
innovation then scale e¤ect will resurface and if horizontal innovation outgrows pop-
ulation growth then horizontal innovation will have negative e¤ect on growth.
Chapter three used a share of output instead of human capital alone as an input
in research and introduce human capital in the product market to show that both
innovation and human capital matter for long run growth rate. I show that once
human capital , population growth, horizontal innovation , physical capital and tech-
nological progress are growing at a constant rate; then scale e¤ect will be eliminated.
I also show that if horizontal innovation outgrows population growth, the economy
will grow by more because horizontal innovations open up new sectors on which ver-
tical innovation could thrive when the existing vertical innovation becomes di¢ cult
to innovate on. If on the other hand population growth outgrows horizontal innova-
tion then population growth will have a negative e¤ect on growth. Therefore given
the empirical support mentioned above that population growth has negative e¤ect
on growth suggest that horizontal innovations have not kept pace with population
growth.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows as: In section 3.2, I introduce the
decentralized economy with private monopolists market structure and showe how
population growth, physical and human capital enters R&D growth model. Then, I
introduce human capital accumulation production function and solve the household
dynamic optimization for the decentralized economy. In section 3.3, I work out the
steady state analysis and in section 3.4 I o¤er conclusion.
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3.2 Model
In this paper, I built a scale invariant model where a share of output is used for
research . The intermediate goods sector uses physical capital as an input; and the
nal goods sector uses human capital and intermediate goods as input. Like chapter
two(except for the concept of learning), the present model follows a Schumpeterian
framework but introduce horizontal innovation and population growth.
3.2.1 Product Market
Output is produced under perfect competition and used for consumption, research and
can be stored in the form of capital . The production of output depends on inputs
of di¤erent intermediate products. Once idea with a productivity parameter Ai is
generated from research, it is produced into intermediate goods using physical capital
by the rm with exclusive access to the technology o¤ered by patent protection. By
virtue of that exclusivity, such a rm becomes a monopolist in his industry. Then,
the intermediate goods serve as input in the production of the nal good. Thus the
aggregate production function is given as
Yt = Ct+Nt+It =

(1  u) Lt
Qt
ht
1 a
A1 at
Z Qt
0
xaitdi = ((1  u)Ht)1 aA1 at
Z Qt
0
xaitdi
(3.1)
where 0 < a < 1
This equation shows that output Yt can be stored as capital, denoted by gross
investment It, used for consumption denoted by Ct and for research denoted by Nt.
xit is the ow of intermediate input i 2 [0; Qt]. At is the productivity attached to
the latest quality improvement of the existing sectors . Unlike chapter two where I
considered xed population, here Lt = ent , where nt denotes exogenous population
growth rate. I assume that horizontal innovation is an exogenous serendipitious
process which occurs for the emergence of new sectors. Let Qt denote the number
of intermediate goods . So that Lt
Qt
represents the assumption that the number of
sectors Qt must grow at the same rate as the number of people Lt which will tend to
a constant '1. This condition is usually used to eliminate scale e¤ect in models with
proliferation argument ( see: Howit (1999), Jones (1999), Aghion and Howit (1999)).
Let (1  u) denote the fraction of time devoted to the production by human capital
in production of output; where Lt
Qt
ht = Ht, so that we can consider human capital
Ht, as the number of workers per sector LtQt , multiplied by the human capital of the
typical worker, ht. This assumption implies that the quantity of workers LtQt and the
1To see how this is derived, lets assume that horizontal innovation arrives at the poisson rate %.
Where _Q = %Lt and _Lt = nLt. Thus the ratio '  LtQt implies _' = n't   '2t . By setting _' = 0,
you get '  n%
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quality of workers ht are perfect substitute, so that we can think of ht as human
capital embodied labour supply.
The supply of physical capitalKt must equal the demand of physical capital which
is the sum of all sectors demand
R Qt
0
xitdi =
R Qt
0
Kitdi. The average productivity
At =
R 1
0
Aitdi represent productivity of already existing sectors. Intermediate inputs
across all sectors are produced using physical capital by a monopolist rms with
access to the latest technology according to
xt = (1  v)Kt (3.2)
where (1  v) is the fraction of time devoted by physical capital in the production
of intermediate goods. Kt is the amount of physical capital used as input. Thus
the economy wide cost to monopolists is Rtxt = RtKt Where Rt is the rental rate of
physical capital .
The monopolists maximize their prot t, measured in units of nal good through
the prot function
t = Ptxt  Rtxt (3.3)
where Pt denotes the price of intermediate goods and their revenues equal Ptxt.
I assumed that the nal good production sectors are perfectly competititve, so that
Pt is the marginal product of the intermediate inputs in producing the nal goods.
Therefore the marginal revenue Ptxt will imply
H1 at aAtx
a
t ; (3.4)
hence the prot to monopoly rms would be
t = H
1 a
t aA
1 a
t x
a
t ; Rtxt (3.5)
The equilibrium demand function expressed in terms of the ratio of e¤ective phys-
ical capital to human capital ratio can be written as
(1  v)Kt
At (1  u)Ht =

a2
Rt
 1
1 a
(3.6)
the equilirium rental rate and wage rate in per e¢ ciency unit of physical capital
to human capital ratio are respectively written as
Rt = a
2

(1  v)Kt
At (1  u)Ht
a 1
= a2

(1  v)Kt
At (1  u)ht'
a 1
(3.7)
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and
! =
wt
At
= (1  a)

(1  v)Kt
At (1  u)Ht
a
= (1  a)

(1  v)Kt
At (1  u)'ht
a
(3.8)
substituting equation (3.7) into equation (3.5) to determine the prot function as
t =  (kt)At (1  u)Ht (3.9)
where the productivity adjusted prot function is
 (kt) = a(1  a)

(1  v)Kt
At (1  u)Ht
a
(3.10)
If you substitute equation (3.6) into equation (3.1) , then the production function
for output can be expressed in e¢ ciency unit as
yt = (1  u)Ht

(1  v)Kt
At (1  u)Ht
a
(3.11)
where yt = YtAt
By substituting equation(3.11) into equation (3.8) we can determine the wage rate
which depends on output as follows
!t = (1  a)

yt
(1  u)Ht
a
(3.12)
equation(3.12) provides a working equation which helps in solving the solution of
this model as we will see later.
Notation 2. The equilirium in this model is a senario where output Yt; human
capital ht, labour supply Lt, horizontal innovation Qt, research e¤ort Nt, physical
capital Kt and vertical innovation At are all growing at the same constant rate.
3.2.2 Vertical Innovation
Quality improvement is referred in innovation literature as vertical innovation(see:
Aghion and Howit (1992)). Ideas owing out from innovation are used to produce
intermediate products which are used as inputs in the production of the nal goods
in order to increase the level of output.
There are di¤erent research sectors for intermediate goods. Following the conven-
tional assumption of Poisson rate of arrival of innovation; the Poisson arrival rate of
innovation in each sector i is Nit .Nit denotes the amount of research e¤ort devoted
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to sector i. Because the prospective payo¤ to research is the same in all sectors,
the equilibrium research expenditure is the same in all sectors.
Let the Poisson rate of arrival of innovations be given as
_At = Nt (3.13)
 > 0 is the productivity parameter for R&D.
Following Caballero and Ja¤e (1993), the impact of the leading edge technology as
innovation arrives is denoted by the extra services it o¤ers represented as  > 0. Since
knowlege spillover circulate without cost, knowledge grows at a rate proportional to
the aggregate rate of innovations. Therefore the rate of technological progress at each
date yields
gt =
_At
At
= nt ; (3.14)
where nt = NtAt(1 u)Ht
In equilibrium, the level of vertical R &D is determined by the zero prot condition
; that is, the marginal cost of an extra unit of vertical R & D equal the marginal
expected benet given as
At = Vt: (3.15)
Where Vt is the value of a vertical innovation and At represents the marginal
cost of raising the research intensity Nt . This equation governs the dynamics of the
economy over its successive innovation.
The value Vt is determined by the asset equation;
rVt = t   ntVt (3.16)
this equation says that the expected present value of the future prots during a
unit time interval is equal to the ow of prot to be earned by the incumbent before
being replaced. This equation assumes Arrow e¤ect: which is the assumption that
the incumbent does not innovate because he view further innovation as a negative
expected value. The value to the leader is thus
Vt =
t
r + nt
(3.17)
This equation captures the e¤ect of creative destruction on innovation, particularly
increase in the rate of arrival of innovation shortens the duration of the monopolys
prot thereby destroying the position of the incumbent monopolist . Thus it is
standard to predict that this e¤ect will kill the incentive for innovation. For instance
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if inventors have perfect foresight and knows that thier innovation will be destroyed
by the next entrant, they will not innovate.
In the steady state , the zero prot condition in equation (3.15) can be divided
by At to get 1 = ~v, where ~v = VtA is the productivity - adjusted value of a vertical
innovation. Furthermore I assume that R&D expenditure are subsidized at a rate
proportional to s, so that the zero prot condition implies
1  s = ~v (3.18)
Where s is the subsidy rate.
Using equation (3.9) ,(3.17) and (3.18) we can express the steady state equilibrium
level of research intensity where research e¤ort N , is growing at a constant rate with
human capital , horizontal innovation, vertical innovation and population growth.
Thus the research intensity equation will imply
1  s = 
a(1  a) y
(1 u)H
r + n
= 
a(1  a)

(1 v)K
A(1 u)h'
a
r + n
(3.19)
where '  n
%
Proposition 3. If horizontal innovation and population growth do not grow at a
constant rate; then increase in the growth rate of horizontal innnovation has a positive
e¤ect on growth @n
@%
> 0 while increase in population growth has negative e¤ect on
growth. @n
@n
< 0
The intuition behind the proposition @n
@%
> 0 is that increase in horizontal innova-
tion parameter leads to the creation of new sectors on which vertical innovation can
build on when vertical innovation on the existing sectors become di¢ cult to improve
on; which is contrary to the predictions of Jones (1999), Howitt (1999) and Aghion
and Howitt (1999) that horizontal innovation would have a neutralizing e¤ect on ver-
tical innovation. For @n
@n
< 0 , this is simply the dilution e¤ect of population growth
on capital accumulation and explaines why the present model is scale invariant.
Substitute the steady state interest rate derived below from equation (3.42) as
 + "gn to determine the steady state research intensity as
nt =
a(1  a)

(1 v)K
A(1 u)h'
a
   ( 1  s)
[" + ] ( 1  s) (3.20)
Finally substitute n into the growth equation (3.14) to yield
gn =
_At
At
=
0@

a(1  a) y
(1 u)H

   ( 1  s)
[" + 1] ( 1  s)
1A ; (3.21)
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This model used a share of output instead of human capital alone as an input
in research and introduce human capital in the product market to show that both
innovation and human capital matter for long run growth rate. I show that once
human capital , population growth, horizontal innovation , physical capital and tech-
nological progress are growing at a constant rate; then scale e¤ect will be eliminated.
I also show that if horizontal innovation outgrows population growth, the economy
will grow by more because horizontal innovations open up new sectors on which ver-
tical innovation could thrive when the existing vertical innovation becomes di¢ cult
to innovate on. If on the other hand population growth outgrows horizontal innova-
tion then population growth will have a negative e¤ect on growth. Therefore given
the empirical support in Brander and Dowrick (1994), Kelley and Schmidt (1995)
and Ahituv (2001) that population growth has negative e¤ect on growth suggest that
horizontal innovations have not kept pace with population growth.
3.2.3 Human Capital Accumulation
The ow of human capital can be written as
_H = 

(uHt)
 : (vKt)
1 

(3.22)
where 0 <  < 1
where v is the fraction of time that physical capital is used in the production of
human capital and u denotes the fraction of time that human capital is used in the
production of human capital.  denotes the productivity parameter of human capital
accumulation.
The growth rate of human capital can be written as
_H
H
= u:v1 

Kt
Ht
1 
(3.23)
3.2.4 Household
The utility function is time separable. The aim is to maximize the discounted, innite
stream of utility U , given by
max
Z 1
0
U(Ct)e
 ( n)tdt: (3.24)
 is the rate of time preference,
The instantanous utility can be represented as
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U( Ct) =
C1 "t
1  " (3.25)
Ct denotes aggregate consumption. " denotes the elasticity of marginal utility
Let the budget constraint be represented as
_Kt = wt (1  u)Ht + rt (1  v)Kt   nKt   Kt   Ct  Nt (3.26)
Where Nt denotes the share of output used for research. wt is the wage rate and
rt is the rate of returns
The current value Hamiltonian is
H = U(Ct)+[wt (1  u)Ht+rt (1  v)Kt nKt Kt  Ct Nt] + 
h


(uHt)
 (vKt)
1 
i
(3.27)
There are two state variable denoted by physical capital and human capital and
the associated co state variable  and  respectively.
The necessary rst order condition is
(Atct)
 " =  (3.28)
where ct = CtAt .
_ =    [(1  v) rt   ]   
h


(uHt)
 v1  (1  )K t
i
(3.29)
_ =     [wt (1  u)]   
h


uH 1t (vKt)
1 
i
(3.30)
@H
@v
= rKt =  
h


(uHt)
 (Kt)
1  (1  ) v 
i
(3.31)
where
 

=
rKth


(uHt)
 (Kt)
1  (1  ) v 
i = rh


(uHt)
 (Kt)
  (1  ) v 
i (3.32)
@ H
@u
= wHt =  
h


Ht u
 1 (vKt)
1 
i
(3.33)
where

 
=
h


Ht u
 1 (vKt)
1 
i
wH
=
h


H 1t u
 1 (vKt)
1 
i
w
(3.34)
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_

=    r +  (3.35)
_ 
 
=    

H 1t u
 1 (vKt)
1 

+  =    
 


vKt
uHt
1 !
(3.36)
By equating equation(3.32) and (3.34) yields
Kt
Ht
=
w (1  )u
rv
(3.37)
the transversality condition can thus be expressed as
lim
t!1

(Kt) exp
 t = 0 (3.38)
lim
t!1

(Ht) exp
 t = 0 (3.39)
Since
d
dt(Atct)
 "
(Atct)
 " =  "

_At
At
+ _ct
ct

then the equation that determines consumption will imply that variables will be
growing in their e¢ ciency units according to the growth of innovation gn is

_ct
ct

=
0B@a2

(1 v)Kt
At(1 u)Ht
a 1
     
"
  gn
1CA (3.40)
set

_ct
ct

= 0 so that the steady state interest rate gives
r = a2

(1  v)Kt
At (1  u)Ht
a 1
   =  + "gn (3.41)
This equation shows the steady state interest rate used to discount monopolists
prot
The budget constraint will be growing at the rate of innovation thus
_kt = (1  u)Ht

(1  v) kt
At (1  u)Ht
a
  ct   Nt
At
  ( + gn + n+) k (3.42)
Note that all variables expressed in the budget constriant are all represented in
their e¢ ciency unit.
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Using equation (3.23), (3.37) and (3.12) the growth rate of human capital in per
capita terms can be written as
gh =
_h
h
= u
0@(1  a)

y
(1 u)H
a
(1  )
r
1A
1 
(3.43)
3.3 Steady State Growth Analysis.
Since the contribution of physical and human capital in both physical capital accu-
mulation and human capital accumulation will be equal in the steady state, therefore
the growth rate of human capital will equal the growth rate of innovation thus;
0@

a(1  a) y
(1 u)H

  ( + n) ( 1  s)
[" + 1] ( 1  s)
1A = u
0@(1  a)

yt
(1 u)Ht
a
(1  )
r
1A
1 
(3.44)
where yt
Ht
= (1  u)   +"gn+
a2
 a
a 1 can be determined using equation (3.7) and
equation (3.41)
This equation shows the steady state equilibrium condition for human capital
accumulation and for innovation. Hence both innovation and human capital matters
for long run growth rate.
3.4 Conclusion.
This paper introduces physical and human capital accumulation into R&D growth
model in a scenario where population is growing. Unlike Keith, Hung, & Pozzolo
(2000) which argued that long run growth may be determined by human capital alone,
here; I show that long run growth depends on both human capital accumulation and
innovation. The reason why Arnorld and Blackburn et.al s result are not robust
is because they assumed that research sector uses only human capital input. Such
assumption is hardly convincing because R&D uses a whole lot of input like physical
capital, human capital etc.
Finally, this paper presented a scale invariant model where horizontal innova-
tion does not have dilution e¤ect on vertical innovation; rather it enhances vertical
innovation by introducing new sectors from which vertical innovation can ourish.
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Chapter 4
The E¤ects of Competition as Psychological
Threat on Innovation and Growth.
4.1 Introduction.
Is competition good or bad for innovation and growth? The standard Schumpeterian
literatures (see: Aghion and Howit (1992) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) ) argued
that the incentive to perform research by entrant rms depends on the monopoly rent
earned by the incumbent monopolist who has access and exclusive right to appro-
priate from the leading edge innovation; often secured by patent. The limit of appro-
priation of the present discounted prot occurs when entrant rms develop superior
technology that leapfrog the incumbent through the process of creative destruction.
Thus Schumpeterian literature concluded unequivocally that intense competition
would disincentivize the entrants from doing innovation for fear of being leapfrogged
by the next entrant and thus have negative e¤ect on innovation and growth.
But this prediction about the e¤ects of competition on innovation runs contrary
to the empirical works of Nickell (1996) and Blundell et al. (1995) which showed a
positive relationship between product market competition and productivity growth
within a rm or industry. Thier research has motivated theoretical model of R&D
where product market competition has positive e¤ect on innovation. For instance,
Aghion , Harris and Vickers (2001) developed a model with no entry where only the
incumbents compete in a Bertrand duopoly equilibrium with cost reducing view of
innovation, where the value of each rm depends on technological gap across rms and
not on the productivity level of innovation. Their framework eliminate leapfroging
e¤ect( which is the reason why standard Schumpeterian model predicted a negative
e¤ect of competition on innovation). Thus they argued that some amount of product
market competition will lead to more innovation when rms are neck neck as the
leader tries to escape competition to avoid his prot being dissipated by other rms.
But competition by incumbent rms alone in a duopoly setting does not highlight
an economic structure with rm entry. For instance, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003)
showed that the high cost of entry and lower degree of turnover accounted for the
lower growth rate of Europe compared to United state. So it would be interesting to
study how cost of entry determine the nature of competition and innovation.
The current chapter provides the rationale for exogenous threat of rm entry. I
endogenise rm entry and show that the reason why rm entry is represented as an
exogenous threat is because in a Nash equilibrium, incumbents who could engage in
innovation would have technological advantage over entrants(Otherwise, incumbents
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could not innovate due to Arrows e¤ect). Hence, when technological advantage is
large, incumbents would raise their R&D e¤ort to deter rm entry. Furthermore
I argue that there is an implicit psychological threat that the incumbent feel to
make him innovate and escape competition when he has technological advantage.
This framework is supported by the empirical work of Goolsbee and Syverson (2004)
who examined how incumbent behavior changes in response to exogenous changes in
potential entry that otherwise have no e¤ect on current competitive conditions. They
found that incumbent airlines cut their fares when an entrant merely annouces thier
intention of entry, even before actual entry.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 4.2 I introduce innovation
by incumbent and entrants and show that incumbent have technological advantage
over entrants. In section 4.3 I determine the equilibrium outcome which shows that
only incumbents innovate in equilibrium. Then I argue that there is an implicit
pyschological threat that makes the incumbent to innovate when he has technological
advantage. Finally I o¤er conclusion.
4.2 Model
The setup in this paper is built to challenge the basic Schumpenterian growth frame-
work of Aghion and Howitt (1992) which argued that only the entrant rms do inno-
vation (and never the incumbent rm).
Their model predicted a continual leapfrogging of leadership position within an
industry as the incumbent is replaced at the time of the next quality improvement by
an entrant competitor, who is subsequently replaced by another entrant. Hence their
model predicted that intense competition will disuade rms from doing innovation
which leads to negative e¤ect on innovation, as continual leapfrogging reduces the
size of prot that the leader(a monopolist) gains. Because thier model runs contrary
to the real world experience where quality improvements are carried out mostly by
existing incumbents rms; and where competition has a positive e¤ect on growth; the
present model is built to capture this real world experience.
The present model considers an economy with industries indexed by j 2 (0; 1).
The nal goods sector is perfectly competitive and is produced using a continuum of
di¤erent intermediate goods from each industry. The total endowment of labour in the
economy is denoted by Lt = ent which is supplied inelastically and nt is exogenous
population growth. In each intermediate input industry, rms can devote R&D
resources to improve the quality of of industrys intermediate input. By improving on
the current best-quality intermediate input produced in an industry, a successful R&D
rm earns monopoly prots from selling its leading-edge intermediate input to nal
good producers. The production process implicity imposes that only highest quality
intermediate good input will be used in the production of the nal goods. Over time,
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as the quality of intermediate inputs used in nal good production rises, workers
become more productive, and thus R&D fuels per capita consumption growth.
4.2.1 The Consumer Sector
I assume that economy is populated by identical individuals who supply labour in
exchange for wage and recieve interest income on assets, buys goods for consumption
and save by accumulating assets.
Each consumer maximizes a familiar expression for utility
U( Ct) 
1Z
0

C1 "t   1
1  "

e tdt (4.1)
Ct is the consumers nal good consumption at time t,  > 0 is the subjective
discount rate, and " > 0 is the constant elasticity of marginal utility with respect to
consumption. Maximizing the utility subject to the consumers intertemporal budget
constraint yields the usual intertemporal consumer optimization condition;
_Ct
Ct
=
rt   
"
(4.2)
where rt is the equilibrium interest rate at time t.
4.2.2 Product Markets
The production of output depends on inputs of di¤erent intermediate products that
are produced by rms with access to leading edge innovation. Let the production
function for nal good be denoted by
Yt = A
Z 1
0
(qjtxjt)
a dj; (4.3)
where 0 < a < 1,
xjt denotes the quantity of intermediate input of type j at time t and qjt denotes
the quality of the intermediate input used in the production process. The para-
meter A is the overall measure of productivity. The model starts o¤ with growth
engine that will depend on two forms of process innovation that leads to quality im-
provement namely: (1) Incremental innovation by incumbents and (2) innovation by
entrants via creative destruction. But in equilibrium the model will show that only
the incumbents will undertake innovation. For the time being, let qjt be the quality of
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intermediate input j at time t. When innovation occurs via incremental innovation
by an incumbent, the quality ladder for each intermediate good can be denoted as
qjt = 
zj (4.4)
where  > 1 and zj denotes the number of incremental innovations on the inter-
mediate good j:
Similarly if innovation occurs via creative destruction by an entrant the quality
ladder for each intermediate good can be denoted as
qjt = 
zj (4.5)
where  >  and zj denotes the number of quality improvement by entrant in
industry j: The assumption that  >  captures the intuition that innovation by
entrants are more radical than innovation by incumbents. Empirical evidence for this
assumption can be found in the work of Akcigit and Kerr (2010) who showed from
the US Census of Manufacturers that large rms engage more in exploitative R&D,
while small rms do exploratory R&D (dened similarly to the notions of incremental
and radical R&D here).
By taking into account the aggregate quality index t 
R 1
0
q
a
1 a
jt dj, the production
function of equation (4.3) can be re-written as
Yt = A
1 a
t (xt)
a ; (4.6)
Each intermediate input is produced using one unit of physical capital
xjt = Kjt (4.7)
where Kj is the amount of physical capital used as input in industry j .
Any rm with access to the leading edge innovation becomes the monopolist and
produces the highest quality intermediate good. The nal goods sector is perfectly
competitive so the price of each input equal its marginal product; aA1 at (xjt)
a 1.
Hence the prot maximization problem in sector j is ;
jt = aA
1 a
t (xjt)
a  Rtxjt (4.8)
the cost to the monopolist is Rtxj; where R is the a given rental rate. The
equilibrium demand function is the sum of all sectorsdemands
R 1
0
xj =
R 1
0
Kj which
must equal the supply of capital, thus the equilibrium demand can be written in terms
of capital as
Kt =

a2
Rt
 1
1 a
A
1
1 at (4.9)
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the equilirium rental rate of capital in per e¢ ciency unit is
Rt = a
2

Kt
t
a 1
A (4.10)
equation (4.8) and (4.10) allows us to determine the equilibrium prot ow as
t =  (kt)t (4.11)
where the productivity adjusted prot function per e¤ective spillover is
 (kt) = A
1
1 aa(1  a)

kt
t
a
(4.12)
4.2.3 Innovation
In each industry j, there are two types of rm that can engage in R&D namely the
incumbent and the entrants. Both the incumbent and the entrants make their R&D
expenditure decisions simultaneously and independently and are free to adjust their
expenditures at any point in time. This model allows for free entry by entrants into
the R&D race and all follower rms has the same R&D technology. There is perfect
competition among entrants in each industry so the the R&D expenditures of each
entrant will be negligible. Both entrants and the incumbent in the economy uses
labour Lt = ent as an input in R&D; where nt denotes exogenous population growth.
The market clearing condition for the larbour market implies
Ntlt = Lm + Le (4.13)
where Lm denotes the ow of resources devoted to R&D by incumbents; while Le
denotes the ow of resources devoted to R&D by entrants
The aggregate quality index can be expressed in terms of contribution due to
incumbents and entrants as follows
t = e + m (4.14)
where e denotes the size of aggregate quality index due to entrants innovation,
while m denotes the size of aggregate quality index due to incumbents innovation.
Let the instantenous probability of R&D success by entrants be dened as
Ie =
Le
e
=
Ntle
e
(4.15)
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so that increase in Nt will raise the number of entrants engage in R&D . Since
this model assumes free entry N = +1. e 
R 1
0
zj
a
1 adj denotes size of aggregate
quality index due to entrants innovation. Notice that the ow of resources Le is
deated by the size of this aggregate quality index e in order to capture the specic
nature of complexity implicit in entrants innovation which will be di¤erent from the
nature of complexity implicit in incumbents innovation. Sagestrom (1998) was the
rst to introduce complexity argument in R&D growth literature which captures
the intuition that growth in economy which raises the quality index t raises the
complexity of innovation over time. But his model introduced complexity argument on
entrants innovation which is the only engine of growth in that model. Sagestrom and
Zolnierek(1998) introduced complexity argument in a model with both incumbent and
entrants innovation but assumed that both incumbent and entrants faced the same
type of complexity. My present model di¤ers from thiers by making the complexity
argument specic to the nature of innovation.
Because leaders are already on the technology frontier, it is easier for them to
advance the frontier than entrant rms. Hence the instantenous probability of R&D
success by incumbents is dened as
Im =
Lm
m
(4.16)
where m =
R 1
0

a
1 a zjdj denotes the size of aggregate quality index due to incum-
bents innovation. Similarly the ow of resources Lm is deated by a share of this
aggregate quality index m in order to capture the specic nature of complexity im-
plicit in incumbent innovation. I assume that  > , so that the complexity argument
implies that incumbents has technological advantage over entrants. Alternatively we
can interprete the specic nature of complexity between entrants and incumbents as
follows; as innovation grows which raises the quality index , it is more di¢ cult to en-
gage in radical innovation zj than incremental innovation zj . Schumpeterian R&D
literature is clear on the issue that only entrants engage in R&D in equilibrium due
to Arrow e¤ect1 except if the incumbent has technological advantage. Sagestrom and
Zolnierek(1998) studied a model with both entrants and incumbent faced with the
same type of complexity, but introduced exogenous parameter to indicate incumbents
technological advantage over entrants. By making complexity argument specic to
the nature of innovation, the present model endogenised technological advantage of
the incumbent.
4.3 The balance Growth equilibrium
1see: Aghion & Howit (1992)
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In this section I analyze the balanced growth equilibrium properties of the model.
When per-capita consumption grows over time at a constant rate. Equation(4.2) im-
plies that the market interest rate r must be constant over time. Let Vm(z) represents
the expected discounted prots earned by a leader that sells a quality z intermediate
input. Likewise, let Ve(z) represents the expected discounted prots earned by an
entrant when the state-of-the-art quality in its industry is z. To maximize expected
discounted prots, both incumbents and entrants must solve stochastic optimal con-
trol problems where the state variable z in each industry j is a Poisson jump process
with intensity Im + Ie and V d is the magnitude which show the value that either the
incumbent or the entrant can earn when the state of the art quality in its industry is
higher than z.
The relevant Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for each incumbent is
rVm(z) = (z) + Im

V dm(z)   Vm(z)
  Lm(z)   IeVm(z)
This equation shows that the incumbent earns the prot ow (z) and incurs the
R&D costs Lm(z) today. With instantaneous probability Im, the incumbent innovates
and learns how to produce an intermediate input higher than quality z . The equation
states that the maximized expected returns on an incumbent rms stock must equal
the return on an equal-sized investment in a riskless bond.
Similarly the relevant Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for entrants is
rVe(z) = Ie

V dm(z)   Ve(z)
  Le(z)   ImVe(z) (4.17)
followers incur the R&D costs Le(z) today but earns no prot ow. With instan-
taneous probability Ie, the entrants innovate become a leader, and learns how to
produce an intermediate input higher than quality z . This equation states that
the maximized expected return on an entrant rms stock must equal the return on
an equal-sized investment in a riskless bond. Since this model assumes free entry
N = +1. Thus, the individual contribution of any particular follower rm i to the
aggregate innovation rate of all entrants is negligible, and
Ve(z) = 0 (4.18)
Free entry condition implies that the net return for entrants R&D is
IeV
d
m(z)   Le(z) = 0 (4.19)
This condition says that the net return from entrants is zero.
Likewise the net return for the incumbent is
Im

V dm(z)   Vm(z)
  Lm(z)   IeVm(z) (4.20)
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Just for the moment if we assume that both entrants and the incumbent are
equally good at conducting research, that is; if Ie = Im > 0 and Le(z) = Lm(z) , then
the free entry condition in equation (4.19) will imply that the incumbents net return
is negative since the net return for entrants is zero. If the incumbent takes entrants
R&D expenditure as given, an increase in the incumbents R&D outlay raises the total
R&D e¤ort thereby lowers the incumbents net return. If entrants also undertake a
given amount of R&D, the leaders best response is to shut down research. This is
called the Arrows e¤ect and is the reason why incumbents dont engage in R&D in
the standard Schumpeterian model.
In order to encourage incumbents R&D, the present model assumes that incum-
bents have cost advantage over entrants. That is Ie = Lee 6= Im = Lmm because of
the assumption that  > , which implies that the growth rate of innovation which
raises the quality index  has specic complexity impact depending on the nature
of the innovation. That is, it is more di¢ cult to engage in radical innovation zj
by entrants than incremental innovation zj by incumbent. Under this assumption,
the free entry condition (4.19) will still imply that entrants net return is zero. But
ImV
d
m(z) Lm(z) > 0 instead of zero. Hence the incumbent is now encourage to engage
in R&D until he drives the entrants outside the market.
Henceforth, I shall focus attention to the scenario where entrants do not innovate,
i.e Ie = 0, Hence the no arbitrage equation for the incumbent can be rewritten as
rVm(z) = (z) + Im

V dm(z)   Vm(z)
  Lm(z) (4.21)
By di¤erentiating Vm(z) with respect to Im yields the rst order condition
V dm(z)   Vm(z)

= m =
Lm
Im
(4.22)
notice that this equation shows that the marginal cost m is equated to the in-
cremental value
h
V dm(z)   Vm(z)
i
rather than the full present value Vm(z) since the
innovating incumbent does not value the expropriation of his own monopoly prot.
Finally substitute equation (4.22) into equation(4.21) to determine Vm(z) as
Vm(z) =
(z)
r
(4.23)
4.3.1 The E¤ects of Competition on the incumbent
It is important to remind the readers that incumbent is able to deter rm entry in
this model because he has technological advantage over entrants. Furthermore, I
argue that there is an implicit psychological threat that the incumbent feel to make
him innovate and escape competition when he has technological advantage. Let the
incumbents e pschological threat of rm entry be modelled as exogenous parameter .
Equation(4.23) shows the full expected value of the incumbent with no real potential
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of actual entry. The incumbent at the technological frontier at time t > 0 would
face no exogenous threat of entry because  is positive, hence entrants as well as the
incumbents face di¢ culty to innovate and the incumbent has technological advantage
to deter entrants. Therefore the incumbent earns the prot (z) =  (k)m . But at
time t = 0, the prot earned by the incumbent is (z) =  (K), because  = 0 and
no di¢ culty is faced by any rm to innovate. But the incumbent earns this prot
only at a probability (1  ) which is the probability of no rm entry. Otherwise
Arrow e¤ect implies that incumbets wont innovate and entrant would leapfrog the
incumbent. Using this intuition it is plausible to interprete the rst order condition
in equation (4.22) in the light of an incremental value derived from the time the
incumbent has no technological advantage but faces no entry to the time he has
technologocal advantage but deter entry. Thus equation (4.22) can be written as ;
 (k)m
r
  (1  )  (k)
r
= m (4.24)
Finally the steady state interest when t is constant is
r =  (k)

1  (1  ) 1m

(4.25)
Di¤rentiate r with respect to  shows the e¤ect of threat of entry as
@r
@
=
 (k)
m
> 0 (4.26)
Increase in  has a positive e¤ect on growth because incumbents with technological
advantage over entrants innovate in order to escape rm entry.
Finally long run growth is determined by exogenous population growth which can
be derived by di¤erentiating equation (4.16) over time as
_Im
Im
=
_Lm
Lm
  _m
m
= 0 (4.27)
where t =
R 1
0
zjdj , t = Im and  = log 
Im =
n (1  a)
a
(4.28)
where n = _Lm
Lm
is exogenous population growth.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper examine the e¤ect of threat of competition on growth in a context where
incumbents innovate because they face psychological threat of entry by new rms. I
found that increase in the threat of competition has positive e¤ect on the balanced
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growth innovation rate. Finally the model predicts that long run growth will depend
on exogenous population growth so the model like Sagestrom (1998), Jones (1995b)
is scale invariant.
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Chapter 5
COMPARISON UTILITY FUNCTION AND
REASEARCH JOINT VENTURE.
5.1 Introduction.
In 2010, the European commision extended the scope of Block Exemption of R&D
Agreement thus;
With a view to facilitating innovation in Europe, the Commission has
considerably extended the scope of the R&DBlock Exemption Regulation,
which now not only covers R&D activities carried out jointly but also so-
called paid-for researchagreements where one party nances the R&D
activities carried out by the other party. In addition, the new Regulation
gives parties more scope to jointly exploit the R&D results.
Block exemption of R&D agreement provides an organising mode for R&D among
rms active in the same market and it is often lauded to prevent duplication of
research which according to Jones (1995) leads to decreasing return in knowledge
spillover. Cozzi and Tarola (2006) showed that duplication of research was due to
information transmission lag; and that the motive to reduce it is an incentive for
RJV. The theoretical works of Brander and Spencer (1983); Spence (1984); Katz
(1986); Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992) all argued in favour of Research Joint
Venture(RJV), that it will have positive welfare e¤ects.
One key refutation of RJV is that it could lead to cooperative rms in R&D col-
luding in the product market. Hence there is a trade o¤between enhanced innovation
and reduced competition.
The empirical work of Sovinsky and Helland (2012) examined the question on
whether product market collusion is an incentive for Research joint Venture by look-
ing at how changes in the antitrust policy a¤ects collusive benet without a¤ecting
Research Joint Ventures. They came up with the conclusion as follows;
we nd the decision to join a RJV is impacted by the policy change.
We also nd the magnitude is signicant: the policy change resulted in an
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average drop in the probability of joining a RJV of 34% among telecommu-
nications rms, 33% among computer and semiconductor manufacturers,
and 27% among petroleum rening rms. Our results are consistent with
research joint ventures serving a collusive function.
Other empirical literatures on the subject includes Snyder and Vonortas (2005)
who showed that multiproject contact can enhance explicit collusion by serving to
bundle markets, which reduces the heterogeneity of rms private information thereby
making collusive agreements more e¢ cient. Duso T. , Röller L-H. and Seldeslachts J
(2014) examined on whether rms engaging in RJV experience a fall in market share
as a result of less competition and found that RJV leads to product market collusion.
From the theoretical point of view, Industrial organizational literatures such as
Cabral (2000) and Martin (1995) argued that RJV could lead to participating rms
owning common assets, hence has shared interest and this provides a punishment de-
vice for non collusive memeber. Cooper and Ross (2009) argued that RJV could lead
to collusion because rms that participate in several market could punish other rms
who deviate from collusion through price war in markets where they are both active.
Miyagiwa (2009); Motchenkova and Rus (2011) aruges that RJV may reduce cost
asymmetries among rms thereby making product market agreements more stable
The aim of this paper is to provide a macroeconomic framework which examines
the impact of RJV on economic growth when RJV rms also engage in collusion in
the product market. To simply the analysis, I introduce a duopoly market structure
where the duopolists are level in terms of technological progess in their sector. Thus
they have more incentive to collude in other to avoid Bertrand competition. Then
I made a novel contribution by introducing consumption externality under duopoly
market structure with level sectors to show that duopolist in a level sector may also
collude in the product market in order to internalize consumption externality that
no single rm can internalize, in an economy where consumersutility depends not
only on the level of their consumption but also on how their consumption compares
to some reference stock widely known as "keeping up with the Joneses." By colluding
to internalize the reference stock, the duopolist can operate a dynamic pricing model
to encourage habit formation. That is, they reduce their price when the reference
stock is low in order to encourage consumption but gradually increase their price as
the reference stock increases. This process encourages individuals who would have
been detered by high price of a product to learn how to spend more as thier habit
towards the product increases. This paper features two key parameters denoted by
 which measures the importance individuals place on the reference stock and the
parameter J which measures the level of the reference stock. I found that increase in
 has a negative e¤ect on growth because it raises the shadow cost of dynamic pricing
model. But increase in J has a positive e¤ect on growth because it raises the price
that the duopolist can charge as habit formation rises. Hence it raises incentive for
more innovation.
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Other related literatures include; Turnovsky and Liu (2005) who introduced con-
sumption externality into a neoclassical technology but emphasised on characterizing
the equilibrium and e¢ ciency issues. Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Dupor and
Liu (2003) showed that consumption externality is a major cause of ine¢ ciency as
its competitive equilibria breaks even with pareto optimality. Outside growth liter-
atures, consumption externality has been introduced in asset pricing literatures to
explain equity premium puzzle (see: Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Gali (1994),
and Campbell and Cochrane (1995) among others). Easterlin (1995) empirical study
shows that unilateral income growth does not increase happiness which supports con-
sumption externality models. Clark and Oswald (1996) o¤er empirical evidence to
support that well being is dependent on income comparison. Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) happiness depend on relative well being (see also: Carroll 1998 and Frank
1985). Campbell and Cochrane (1999) follow similar framework to study savings and
consumption behaviour .
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 5.2, I present the utility
function with non time separable preference as well as the reference stock. Then I show
how RJV internalize the evolution of the referenc stock in order to maximize prot
by encouraging habit formation. In section 5.3 I show the impact of the reference
stock on the steady state. Finally I o¤er conclusion.
5.2 Model
This paper features a duopoly in a level sector where the two rms collude in order to
avoid price competition and to enable them internalize the evolution of the reference
stock. Internalizing the evolution of the reference stock implies that they operate a
dynamic pricing model in order to encourage habit formation.
5.2.1 Utility function
Given L identical households where population is constant through time. I assume
that households utility depends not only on the absolute level of consumption but also
on a reference stock. My utility function follows Carroll , Overland and Weil (1997)
who has earlier considered an interdependent preference using the conventional AK
production function.
The representative household maximizes the discounted, innite stream of utility
U , given by
U = max
Z 1
t
U(Ct; Zt)e
 tdt: (5.1)
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 is the rate of time preference, where Ct denotes aggregate goods consumption
of goods and Zt represents the reference stock.
The instantenous utility for each household is given by
U(Ct; zt) =
Z 1
0
 
Cjt Z
 
jt
1  v
!1 v
dj; (5.2)
where j 2 (0; 1) denotes the sectors.
Notice that this equation can be rewritten as
R 1
0
0B@C1 jt
 
(Cjt)
Zjt
!
1 v
1CA
1 v
dj; which
shows more clearly that utility does not depend only on absolute level of consumption
but also on consumption relative to the reference stock. Let 0 <  < 1. I assume that
v = 1
1  , which implies that v > 1
1. v determines the elasticity of marginal utility;
and  determines the importance placed on the reference stock and thus characterises
the e¤ects of the reference stock on the wellbeing of an individual. Here it exerts
negative externality on the individual absolute level of consumption. For instance,
the standard isoelastic utility will imply a rapid decline in the marginal utility when
v > 1 in response to increase in individuals consumption level . Hence an individual
with v > 1 will not be able to consume relative to the reference stock unless there is
a non time separable preference which exerts a negative exerternality on individuals
absolute consumption level. In general the interaction between v and  determine
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution which may vary depending on the time
horizon considered in equation (5.3). If the time horizon is zero then habit does not
evolve but remains xed and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution would be 1
v
.
If on the other hand, the time horizon goes to innity, then habit fully adjusts to
change in consumption. Setting Cjt = Zjt implies a long run intertemporal elasticity
of substitution equal to 1
v+(1 v) . Thus the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
will be greater in the case of comparison utility function where 0 <  < 1 than the
case of standard isoelastic utility function when  = 0 which implies 1
v
< 1.
Proof. since elasticity of intertemporal substitution(EIS) is the reciprocal of the
proportionate change in the magnitude of the elasticity of marginal utility with respect
to change in consumpution. Given that relative risk aversion RRA =  Uccc+Uczz
Uc
.
SinceU c = Uccc
 + Uczz and UccUc =
 v
ci
, Ucz
Uc
= (v 1)
zi
. Then EIS = 1
v+(1 v) . If  = 0
then EIS = 1
v
. For 0 <  < 1 and v > 1 then 1
v+(1 v) >
1
v
Each Cj is the sum of two goods produced by a duopolist in sector j
1v > 1 is empirically supported by Guvenen(2006)
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Cjt = CAj + CBj (5.3)
where i = A;B
5.2.2 The Reference Stock
The reference stock is dened as the average level of past consumption of others. An
individual who consumes relative to the reference stock ignores the e¤ect that his
present consumption induces on his future utility through its e¤ect on the average
consumption. So the household assumes that the reference stock will be constant if
he raises his net utility.
Let the reference stock for each household be
Zjt = J
Z t
 1
eJtCtdt (5.4)
where Ct is the average level of consumption in the economy. J > 0 is a parameter
that captures the relative weight of consumption at di¤erent times . If J is small then
less weight is placed on past consumption and an individual who consumes relative
to the references stock will consume more today under the assumption of v > 1;
hence the level of the reference stock is low. But if J is large, more weight is placed
on past consumption and an individual who consumes relative to the reference stock
will consume less today, hence the level of the reference stock is high . Therefore
the parameter J shows the inuence of current consumption in determining future
reference stock.
Di¤erentiating equation (5.4) over time yields the evolution of the reference stock;
_Zjt = J
 
Ct   Zjt

(5.5)
Individuals maximize their static utility by spreading their expenditure Et equally
across all product lines j. The primal problem is to
maximize
U(Ct; Zt) (5.6)
subject to
Et =
Z 1
0
jtCjtdj (5.7)
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where Et is the expenditure and jt represents price of good Cjt. Solving for cjt
yields the marshallian demand function for cjt units of good j (see: Appendix A)
cjt =
Et
  1
v
jt Z
(v 1)
v
jt A
1 v
v
jtR 1
0

jtZ

jt
Ajt
 v 1
v
dj
(5.8)
where cjt =
Cjt
Ajt
represents demand good j adjusted by the technological level ,
the aggregate equilibrium price index is given by (See also: Appendix A)
Pt =
"Z 1
0

jtZ

jt
Ajt
 v 1
v
dj
# v
v 1
(5.9)
Finally the condition for equilibrium in the nal goods market implies
Et =
Z 1
0
jtcjtdj = 
v 1
v
t Z
(v 1)
v
t A
1 v
v
t [Pt]
 ( v 1
v
) Et = Ptct (5.10)
The optimization problem for the household can be written by substituting equa-
tion (5.10) into equation (5.1) thus.
max
Z 1
0
E
[Pt]
e tdt: (5.11)
expressed in log form as
max
Z 1
0
logEt   log [Pt] e tdt: (5.12)
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint.
_ = wtL+ rt:  Et (5.13)
wt is the wage rate and L is the societys xed labour supply which is supplied
inelastically. rt is the rate of returns and  denotes assets.
By maximization, spending grows according to
_Et
Et
= rt    (5.14)
This is the conventional Euler equation which holds for every household. We
can normalize price to ensure that nominal spending stays constant through time by
setting Et = 1, so that equation(5.14) implies
rt =  (5.15)
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5.2.3 Production Function
Each product j has the potency of being produced into di¤erentiated qualities due to
vertical improvement in that product. Utility for vertically di¤erentiated goods will
generate demand and hence we can study innovation that generate quality advance-
ment. Let the quality Ajt of any given product in industry j be marked by the
generation m of that product. I assume that each new generation provides times
better services than the previous generation. Thus rms in sector j uses labour as the
only input, according to a constant returns production function, and takes the wage
rate as given. Therefore one unit of labour currently employed by sector j generates
an output ow equal to
Ajt = Ajt = 
mjt (5.16)
where  > 1 is a parameter that measures the size of innovation.
5.2.4 Equilibrium in Level Sectors
In this model, I consider a duopolist in a level sector who collude as to maximize
thier joint prot and share the proceeds. One reason for duopolist in a level sector
to collude is to avoid price competition. Because this will imply that equilibrium
price will fall to a unit cost and each rm will earn zero prot. The present model
argues later that there can be other incentive for a duopolist to collude in the product
market. In equilibrium all sectors will act the same so I shall hencefort drop subscript
j in order to consider equilibrium conditions.
Equilibrium prot maximization implies
t = (t  Rt) ct (5.17)
By substituting ct from equation (5.8) into equation (5.17) yields the prot func-
tion
t = Z
(v 1)
v
t A
1 v
v
t [Pt]
 ( v 1
v
)Et(
v 1
v
t  Rt 
1
v
t ) (5.18)
5.2.5 Innovation.
The research sector comprises of a duopoly with the cost function
nit (5.19)
where i = A;B and nt = NtAt is the share of output adjusted productivity used in
research e¤ort
with the total cost function given as
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nt = nA + nB (5.20)
I assume that rms collude in the research sector so that they can collude in
the product market in order to internalize the evolution of the reference stock and
encourage habit formation. This specication captures the intuition in Sovinsky and
Helland (2012) whose empirical result found that collusion in the product market is
often an incentive for research joint venture.
The growth rate of technological progress is written as
gt =
_At
At
= nt (5.21)
where
h
1  1
At
i
=  is the size of innovation and  is the productive parameter
for innovation.
5.2.6 Other Incentive for collusion in the Product Market.
Consumption externality model has been studied under both AK model and Romer
type endogenous growth model which employed perfect competitive market structure.
But much of the contribution has focused on the e¤ects on transitional dynamics [see:
Carroll , Overland andWeil. (1997), Alvarez-Cuadrado et.al (2004)]. Here I introduce
consumption externality in order to explain its long run growth rate e¤ect as an
endogenous equilibrium outcome of the behaviour under imperfect market structure.
I assume that each individual duopolist cannot internalize the reference stock, hence
there is an incentive to collude in order to internalize the reference stock. By colluding
to internalize the reference stock, the duopolist can encourage habit formation.
Hence, I allow collusive rms to exploit the impact of consumption externality on
the demand behaviour of household and share the prot. Thus the present value of
prots that can be appropriated by collusive rms is therefore subject to equation
(5.5) since they internalize the impact of consumption externality on the behaviour
of household when choosing their price . The optimization behavior of collusive rms
is thus formulated as follows:
Vt = max
1Z
t
te
  R t (r!)d!d (5.22)
Vt is the value of innovation for collusive duopolist which is the present prot 
ow. r! is the instantanous rate of interest at date !. Thus using equation (5.8) the
evolution of the reference stock can be rewritten as
_Zt = J


 1
v
t Z
(v 1)
v
t A
1 v
v
t [Pt]
 ( v 1
v
) Et   Zt

(5.23)
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The current value Hamiltonian is therefore
H = Z
(v 1)
v
t A
1 v
v
t [Pt]
 ( v 1
v
) Et(
v 1
v
t  Rt 
1
v
t )+


J


 1
v
t Z
(v 1)
v
t A
1 v
v
t [Pt]
 ( v 1
v
) Et   Zt

(5.24)
The state variable is the reference stock Zt and the control variable is price t. 

is the shadow price.
The rst order condition is given as
@H
@t
=
v   1
v

  1
v
t +Rt
1
v

 (1+v)
v
t   
J
1
v

 (1+v)
v
t = 0 (5.25)
Solving for t gives the optimal pricing formula as
t =
1
v   1(
J  Rt) (5.26)
And the shadow value is

 = (rt + J) 
 

(v   1)
v
Z
(v 1) v
v
t A
1 v
v
t [Pt]
 ( v 1
v
) E


v 1
v
t  Rt 
1
v + 
J
 1
v
t

(5.27)
Solving for 
 implies

 =

(v 1)
v
Z
(v 1) v
v
t A
1 v
v
t [Pt]
 ( v 1
v
)Et


v 1
v
t  Rt 
1
v
t + 
J
 1
v
t

(rt + J)
(5.28)
Since v > 1 and  > 0 ; it implies that 
: > 0
Notice that the last equation in the bracket in equation (5.28) implies


v 1
v
t  Rt 
1
v
t + 
J
 1
v
t

= tv

1
v

 1
v
t  Rt
1
v

 1 v
v
t + 

1
v
J
 1 v
v
t

= v
v 1
v
t (5.29)
so that we can rewrite equation (5.28) as

 =

(v   1)Z
(v 1) v
v
t A
1 v
v
t [Pt]
 ( v 1
v
)Et
v 1
v
t

(rt + J)
(5.30)
Equation (5.2s) shows the dynamic pricing model rewritten as
t =
1
v   1(

J
Rt
  1)Rt (5.31)
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The term (
J
Rt
 1) shows an additional cost that raise the cost of producing innovation
which makes this equation deviate from the standard price markup on marginal cost
given as t =
1
v 1Rt, where Rt is the rental rate for producing innovation and the
mark up is 1
v 1 which is constant overtime. In the present setting, the markup is
time varying and depends on the evolution of 
.
Given E = 1; substitute equation (5.31) into equation (5.8 ) to get
ct =
1

=
v   1
(
J  Rt) =
v   1
(
J
Rt
  1)Rt
(5.32)
By substituting equation (5.32) into equation (5.17) yields
 =

1  Rt (v   1)
(
J  Rt)

=
"
1  (v   1)
(
J
Rt
  1)
#
(5.33)
The equilibrium aggregate price index implies in equation (5.9) implies that
Pt =

tZ

t
At

(5.34)
Since
A
1 v
v
t [Pt]
 ( v 1
v
)Et
v 1
v
t = (Z

t )
1 v
v (5.35)
where Et = 1
we can rewrite equation (5.30) to

 =
h
(v   1) 1
zt
i
(rt + J)
(5.36)
From equation (5.32) Rt can be written as
Rt =
(1  v)
ct
+ 
J (5.37)
Substitute Rt into the prot function so that
(t) = [1  (1  v)  (
J) ct] (5.38)
Finally substitute equation (5.36) into equation (5.38) to get
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(t) =

v  

(v   1)
(rt + J)
ct
Zt

J

(5.39)
The equilibrium prot function derived here shows that the prot function depends
on ct
Zt
ratio. Notice that if you set  = 0 or J = 0 , then the prot function collapses
to the case of time separable preference where the prot function is denoted by t = v.
Therefore the prot funtion above captures the internalization of the reference stock
for habit formation.
5.3 The balance Growth equilibrium
In this section we analyze the balanced growth equilibrium properties of the model
where per-capita consumption and the reference stock grows over time at a constant
rate. So henceforth I drop subscript t. Equation(5.15) implies that the market in-
terest rate r must be constant over time. Let Vm represents the expected discounted
prots earned the duopolists who sells a quality z innovation. To maximize expected
discounted prots, the duopolists must solve stochastic optimal control problems
where the state variable m is a Poisson jump process with intensity n = nA+nB and
V dm is the magnitude which show the value the duopolists can earn when the state of
the art quality in its industry is higher than m.
Since the duopolist engage in research joint venture the relevant Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation for RJV is
rVm = m + nm

V dm   Vm
 Nm (5.40)
This equation shows that the duopolists earn the joint prot ow m and incur
the R&D costs Nm today. With instantaneous probability nm, they learns how to
produce the next quality innovation higher than quality m . This equation states
that the maximized expected returns on the duopolistsstock must equal the return
on an equal-sized investment in a riskless bond.
By di¤erentiating Vm with respect to nm yields the rst order condition
V dm   Vm

= A (5.41)
this equation shows that the marginal cost A is equated to the incremental value
V dm   Vm

Finally substitute equation (5.41) into equation(5.40) to determine Vm as
Vm =
m
r
(5.42)
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with V dm = AVm , substitute equation (5.42) into equation (5.41) to determine r
as
r = m

1  1
A

(5.43)
In the long run, the reference stock will be growing at the rate of technological
progress thus
_z = J (c  z)  zg (5.44)
Hence the steady state ratio c
z
is
c
z
=
J + g
J
(5.45)
Substitute equation (5.15), (5.39) and (5.45) into equation (5.43) to arrive at
 =

v  

(v   1)(J + nm)
( + J)

 (5.46)
where

1  1
A

=  and g = nm
once we determine research intensity nm it is straightforward to calculate long run
growth using equation (5.21) hence
nm =
v + vJ   2   J   J(v   1)
2(v   1) (5.47)
Finally the growth rate of innovation can be written in terms of parameters as
g =

v + vJ   2   J   J(v   1)
(v   1)

(5.48)
By di¤erentiating the growth rate with respect to J yields
@g
@J
=

v      (v   1)
(v   1)

> 0 (5.49)
By di¤erentiating the growth rate with respect to  yields
@g
@
=
 J(v   1)(v   1)  (v   1)
(v   1)

< 0 (5.50)
This paper features two key parameters denoted by  which measures the impor-
tance individuals place on the reference stock and the parameter J which measures
the level of the reference stock. I found that increase in  has a negative e¤ect on
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growth because it raises the shadow cost of dynamic pricing model. But increase in
J has a positive e¤ect on growth because it raises the price that the duopolist can
charge as habit formation rises. Hence it raises incentive for more innovation.
5.4 Conclusion
This paper introduced non time separable preference into R&D growth model to
examine the e¤ect of market collusion in RJV. I showed that rms may collude in order
to encourage habit formation and maximize prot. On the one hand colluding in the
product market comes with an associated cost due to shadow cost of dynamic optimal
pricing. But on the other hand, I showed that when market collusion encourage
habit formation, the collusive rms will raise prot, which in turn raises incentive for
innovation.
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Chapter 6
EPILOGUE
Now that we have come to the end of the inquiry made in this long thesis, it is
now important to reect on the journey and what we have learnt so far. Firstly, the
obvious contradition between theories and empirics; on what are the determinants of
long run growth have to some extent been resolved. For instance, this thesis showed
that both physical capital and human capital matter for long run growth rate(see:
chapter two and three).
For physical capital, this thesis shows that when learning is introduced into R&D
growth model, it enhances the growth rate of income thereby raising demand for
monopolists goods, which raise incentive for innovation; where long run growth is
determined by innovation. Although Aghion & Howitt (1998) have earlier identied
that physical capital could a¤ect long run growth through this indirect channel by
using Schumpeterian framework with monopoly market structure; my work extends
their model by showing that growth rate is higher when learning is introduced.
With respect to human capital, this thesis shows that human capital introduces
another engine for growth di¤erent from innovation. And both human capital and
innovation matter for long run growth rate. The thesis also shows that it is possible
to build a scale invariant model where horizontal innovation does not have a neutral-
izing e¤ect on vertical innovation . For instance I show that if horizontal innovation
outgrows population growth, the economy will grow by more because horizontal in-
novations open up new sectors on which vertical innovation could thrive when the
existing vertical innovation becomes di¢ cult to innovate on. If on the other hand
population growth outgrows horizontal innovation then population growth will have
a negative e¤ect on growth. Therefore given the empirical support in that popula-
tion growth has negative e¤ect on growth suggest that horizontal innovations have
not kept pace with population growth.
The third contribution made by this thesis is to reconcile theory with empirics on
the impact of competition on growth. I argue that there is an implicit psychological
threat that the incumbents feels to make him innovate and escape competition when
he has technological advantage. I then show that the threat of rm entry has a
positive e¤ect on growth.
Finally, this paper provides a macroeconomic framework which examines the im-
pact of RJV on economic growth when RJV rms also engage in collusion in the
product market. I found that when collusion in the product market encourages mar-
ket formation, it raises incentive to innovate and has positive e¤ect on growth. But
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the cost of operating a dynamic pricing model for encouraging habit formation has
negative e¤ect on growth.
Appendix A
The rst order condition when maximizing U(Ct; zt) with respect to Cj is
U(Ct; zt) =
Z 1
0
 
Cj Z
 
j
1  v
!1 v
dj; (6.1)
subject to
E =
Z 1
0
jCjdj (6.2)
can be written as
j = c
 v
j Z
(v 1)
j A
1 v
j (6.3)
where Cj = Aj
Cj
Aj
represents demand of good j,
Integrating both sides of this equation over all js yields
 =
1
PD
(6.4)
which when combined with equation above rst order condition yields equa-
tion(5.8) in the paper
To determine the equilibrium aggregate price, multiply equation(5.8) by j to
yield
jcj =
E
v 1
v
j Z
(v 1)
v
j A
1 v
v
jR 1
0

(j)Z

j
Aj
 v 1
v
dj
(6.5)
Integrating both sides of this equation over all js yields equation (5.9) in the paper
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